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Investment Efficiency, State-Owned Enterprises and Privatisation: Evidence from 
Vietnam in Transition 
 
1. Introduction 
The efficient allocation of capital is an important determinant of long term growth prospects and the 
productive capacity of the economy. In a neoclassical Solow model, it is not only the volume of 
investment that affects growth but also the marginal value product of capital. It is therefore important 
to understand the corporate determinants of capital efficiency. One particular theme in the 
international literature on firm investment efficiency focuses on the effect of ownership, in particular 
state versus private ownership, on firm performance (Shleifer, 1998; La Porta and Lopez de Silanes, 
1999; Ramamurti, 1997). Many of the studies focus on transition countries which moved from socialist 
to market-oriented economic systems (Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 1999; Claessens, 
Djankov, and Pohl, 1997; Claessens, and Djankov, 1999). This research has also informed many of the 
structural reform programmes that are encouraged by the international financial institutions, and can 
become part of the conditionality attached to official assistance.  
 
Focusing specifically on transition economies in East Asia such as China and Vietnam, there have been a 
number of studies which highlight that despite successfully following investment intensive growth, the 
efficiency of investment has been poor. This is particularly the case where continued state-owned 
enterprise activity is a considerable share of economic activity and where state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) suffer from weak corporate governance and conflicting policy and return objectives (Dollar & 
Wei, 2007; IMF, 2012; Vietnam Development Report 2012; OECD, 2013).  
 
Within this wider context our research considers the effect of ownership on the efficiency of investment 
in Vietnam. Despite strong economic growth since the onset of original “Doi Moi” reforms, Vietnam’s 
more recent growth has slowed. While many factors have contributed, one of the areas which continues 
to pose policy challenges is the performance and ongoing reform of the SOE sector (IMF, 2013; OECD, 
2013; VEPR, 2012). SOE restructuring has been a core policy focus of the government and is a key 
element in the 2011-2015 strategic plan. However, despite ongoing restructuring including privatisation 
and equitization programmes, the SOE sector continues to display poor returns to factor inputs (IMF, 
2013; Vietnam Development Report, 2012). Soft budget constraints, poor corporate governance and 
managerial oversight have led to excessive leverage and poor investment efficiency (IMF, 2013). These 
outcomes arose despite of policy initiatives designed to level the playing field between SOEs and private 
firms such as the 2005 Enterprise Law.  
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Given this backdrop, our research attempts to 1) test the difference in investment efficiency between 
SOEs and private firms and 2) evaluate the effect of privatisiation and equitisation policies on the 
investment efficiency of former SOEs. Our specific contribution is as follows: Firstly, we build on the 
literature which focuses on the impacts of ownership objectives and corporate governance on firm 
efficiency in transition economies (Meggison and Netter, 2001; Chen et al., 2011). The literature 
suggests these objectives can differ between SOEs and private firms due a number of factors including 
moral hazard (Meggison and Netter, 2001; Chen et al., 2011) or soft budget constraints (Berglof and 
Roland, 1998; Hersch et al, 1997; Meggison and Netter, 2001; Schaffer, 1998).  We use a novel dataset 
which includes both SMEs and large firms in Vietnam that is more extensive than has been used in the 
literature to date. The focus on SMEs is salient, given their importance in the development process and 
their greater susceptibility to capital market and product market frictions (Beck et al, 2006; Beck et al; 
2008). We use the fundamental Q model of investment proposed by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) 
and applied empirically by Bierlen and Featherstone (1998), Ryan et al (2014) and O’Toole et al. (2014) 
to test the difference in investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs. This is the first paper which 
has used this approach to evaluate investment efficiency in a developing country context.  
 
This research builds on the work of Chen et al. (2011) and Dollar and Wei (2007) but is the first study in 
the literature to apply a structural model to an extensive dataset which includes both large firms and 
micro, small and medium-sized firms across manufacturing, services and construction sectors. Our 
research therefore contributes to the extant literature by applying a structural investment model and 
exploring the heterogeneity of ownership effects on investment efficiency across groups of firms and 
industries.  
 
Our second contribution builds on the literature which evaluates efficiency changes following ownership 
changes through SOE privatisation and equitization, mainly in Eastern European transition economies 
(Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl, 1997; Earle and Telegdy, 2002; Brown et al., 2006a:b). There is a large 
body of evidence which indicates that the privatisation of state-owned firms leads to significant 
improvements in productivity and profitability (Shleifer, 1998). We build on the existing research (La 
Porta and Lopez de Silanes, 1999; Ramamurti, 1997; Djankov and Pohl, 1997; Claessens and Djankov, 
1999) by focusing on an East Asian transition economy and by applying a structural investment model 
for both SMEs and large firms across difference sectors. We also simultaneously test the differential 
effects of full privatisation, equitization with SOE retaining a controlling shareholding (greater than 50 
percent ownership) and equitization with the state maintaining a minority shareholding (less than 50 
percent ownership). This provides additional insight and complements the extant literature.  
 
A number of findings emerge from our analysis. We find no significant relationship between Q and 
investment for SOEs and a positive and significant effect for private firms. The results are broadly in line 
with Chen et al. (2011) who focused on large Chinese firms. This also holds for both private firms and 
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SMEs as well as across manufacturing, construction and market services sectors. These results suggest 
no link between fundamentals and investment at SOEs; capital input choices are not linked to firm-
specific marginal returns. This is indicative of poor investment efficiency.  
 
Using the structural Q model, we also test the effect of privatisation and equitization policies on the 
investment efficiency of former SOEs. We find that fully privatised former SOEs that have been equitized 
with the state only retaining a minority state shareholding have a positive relationship between Q and 
investment suggesting, that full privatisation improves the efficiency in capital allocation. Our findings of 
an improvement in performance following privatisiation are in line with many studies in the existing 
literature (La Porta and Lopez de Silanes, 1999; Ramamurti, 1997). Our findings are also in line with 
exisiting studies that focus on economies in transition such as Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl (1997) who 
document an improvement in tobins’ Q following privatisation in Czech republic. The results are also in 
line with Pohl, Anderson, Claessens, and Djankov (1999) who use a cross-country study and identify the 
improvement to productivity of privatised to non-privatized firms. Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and 
Rapaczynski (1999) test the differing performance of SOEs and private firms for a sample of 90 SOEs and 
128 private firms in Czech republic, Hungary and Poland and find privatisation to an outside owner 
improves productivity by 9 percent. Our findings indicate that post privatization and equitization, 
reformed firms have a larger sensitivity of investment to Q than private firms which would suggest 
positive efficiency gains following privatisation. These results are also in line with the work of Earle and 
Telegdy (2002) who find positive effects of privatisation on labour productivity in Romania and Brown et 
al. (2006 b) and find a positive effect on domestic firms post privatisation in Hungary, Romania, Russia 
and Ukraine using a multifactor productivity model.  
 
Our findings have a number of important policy implications for Vietnam in transition. We find that SOEs 
do not appear to link investment to neoclassical determinants of returns. Additionally, we find following 
privatisation and equitization with minority SOE shareholdings does improve the investment efficiency 
of firms. A continued focus on reforming the SOE sector and undertaking managed and balanced 
privatisation and equitizisation policies can contribute to improved investment efficiency. This will in 
turn improve growth outcomes over time.   
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents existing literature, section 3 outlines 
the empirical approach and econometric considerations, section 4 presents the data and summary 
statistics. Section 5 contains the empirical results and section 6 concludes.   
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2. Empirical Approach and Econometric Considerations 
To test the efficiency of capital allocation in Vietnam, we use the Q model of finance (Tobin, 1969)1. In 
this framework we test whether the link between fundamentals and investment differs by firm 
ownership. This approach has been used in the context of China by Chen et al. (2011).  
 
This methodology is well established in the international finance literature (Hennessy, Levy, Whited, 
2007; Bond and Soderbom, 2013). The Q model is derived from the value maximisation problem of the 
firm and the Q statistic captures the shadow benefit of investment to the firm i.e. the extra benefit the 
firm gets in terms of profitability of an additional unit of capital. With perfect capital markets, no other 
variable other than the marginal Q is expected to affect investment. 
 
In this simple investment framework, the relationship between Q and firm investment growth is 
expected to be positive i.e. the higher the potential return of additional units of capital, the greater the 
investment rate. While the majority of research to date uses this model to test for the presence and 
extent of capital market imperfections (Ericksen and Whited, 2000; Bond and Soderbom, 2013; O’Toole 
et al., 2014, Ryan et al., 2014), it can also be used to test for the efficiency of investment (Chen et al., 
2011). In essence, by testing how sensitive investment spending is to the marginal product value of 
capital, an evaluation can be made as to how closely investment plans are informed by the underlying 
profitability of the enterprise; a larger coefficient on the Q statistic indicates a greater responsiveness of 
investment to fundamentals and thus greater efficiency in capital allocation.    
 
Our particular contribution to the literature lies in exploring the degree to which the relationship 
between investment and Q is altered by firm ownership. In particular we are interested in evaluating 
whether or not investment responds differently to the Q statistic depending on whether or not the firm 
is state-owned or privately-owned. Our research hypothesis to be tested is therefore: 
H1: Private firms should demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between the Q statistic and 
investment spending. SOEs may have an insignificant relationship or the coefficient is lower. 
Our expectation is that, if the state firms maximise an objective function based on the achievement of 
non-profit, social or political objectives, then the link between Q (capturing capital profitability) and new 
investment should be lower or non-existent. Private firms, maximising a standard firm valuation 
problem, should have a strong relationship between Q and investment, particularly in their 
development phase.    
 
1 For an overview of this model and related literature, please see Erickson and Whited (2000) or O’Toole el al. 
(2013).  
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To empirically test this research hypothesis, we estimate the following empirical equation:  
𝐼
𝐾𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜽𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜸𝒁𝒋𝒕 +   𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜙𝑟+𝜀𝑖𝑡       (3) 
Where I/Kit is the investment rate of capital stock, 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is an empirical estimate of tobins Q. The key 
coefficient in our estimation strategy is 𝛽𝑄 . We expect that this will be lower for SOEs relative to private 
firms.  
 
From the firm’s perspective, if no capital market imperfections exist, then investment decisions should 
be made only on the basis of the expected returns. In this case, if we include a measure of Q in an 
empirical equation driving investment, then no other factors should affect investment other than Q, the 
marginal return per unit.  
 
A difficulty remains in developing an empirical proxy for the unobservable marginal Q. Hayashi (1982) 
outlines the conditions under which average Q is a suitable proxy for marginal Q and this allows the 
estimation of the statistic from observable information. The most well known measure of Q is the ratio 
of the market value of equity and bonds to the book value of the firm (Erikson and Whited, 2006). In the 
context of our research this metric is not applicable as our interest is in SMEs, the majority of whom do 
not have financial market listings.  
 
We therefore use an alternative methodology outlined by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and used 
empirically by Ryan et al. (2014), O’Toole et al. (2014), Bierlen and Featherstone (1998) and Benjamin 
and Phimister (2002). This method uses a vector auto regression (VAR) on firm performance indicators 
to estimate a “fundamental Q” which can be used as a proxy for the Q statistic for firms without bond or 
market listings. This methodology does not draw tobins Q from market data but instead uses an 
alternative which is based on proxies for the marginal value product of capital. It has previously been 
used for Vietnam by O’Toole and Newman (2012).  
 
This is the first time that this method, to estimate a measure of Q for both listed and non-listed SMEs 
across both private and state owned enterprise in a developing country context, has  been utilised in the 
literature on investment efficiency. Previous research has only focused on listed firms. The VAR is as 
follows:  
𝐕𝐢𝐭 = 𝐇𝐕𝐢𝐭−𝟏 + εit                    (4) Qit = (𝐜ʹ[I − δ𝐇])𝐕𝐢𝐭                    (5) 
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Where the vector 𝐕𝐢𝐭 contains proxies for the marginal product value of capital and the error term is a 
composite as in εit = ci + θj   + μr  + τt + ϵit. This errors structure requires the VAR to be estimated 
once the data has been purged of firm-specific time invariant factors, year-fixed effects, region fixed 
effects, and sector fixed effects. The proxies for the marginal value product of capital used in our 
analysis are both the sales to capital and the profits to capital ratio. c is a vector which identifies the 
main mvpk proxy. We chose the sales to capital ratio as this indicator so as to avoid issues relating to 
loss management through depreciation or other allowances that might occur. The discount rate δ is set 
by the econometrician.2 The coefficient vector H is taken from the VAR. The VAR system is estimated 
using the method outlined by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and applied empirically by Love and Zicchino 
(2007). Orthogonal deviations are used to remove firm-fixed effects while year, sector, and ownership 
fixed effects are removed by demeaning prior to estimation.  
 
Once the empirical proxy for Q is developed, it can be included in the investment equation. As with all Q 
proxies, as it is an estimate of the underlying, unobservable Q, it is measured with error. This 
measurement error must be treated. We therefore estimate the investment equation (3) using GMM 
with lagged values of the marginal value product of capital variables as instruments. This ensures that 
both measurement error is dealt with, as well as controlling for any endogeneity between investment, Q 
and the control variables. Additionally, using GMM with instrumental variables cleanses potential 
omitted variable bias that may occur in our model.  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
In Vietnam, the process if SOE reform and the initiatives which are contained in this, has led to a 
reduction in both the number of fully-State-owned SOEs and reduced the scope of their activities in 
terms of both sectoral activity and output contribution (VEPR, 2012; Vietnam Development Report, 
2012). The total number of SOEs has fallen from approximately 12,000 in 1986 to circa 3,000 currently, 
approximately 33 percent of whom are 100% state-owned (Nguyen Ding Cung, 2014).  However, in 
many sectors SOEs still remain dominant, for example, the telecommunications, fertilizer, coal, 
electricity, water supply and insurance sectors all have over 88 percent of output produced by SOEs  
(Nguyen Ding Cung, 2014). 
 
For our research, the data used is novel and has not to date been applied to the investment efficiency 
literature. It is taken from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey which is conducted annually by the General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam. It is a national survey compiled across all 64 provinces and is used as part of 
their National Accounts determination. The survey takes a census of firms with over 30 employees and a 
2 In line with Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) we use a discount rate of 0.8. Sensitivity analysis of values ranging 
from 0.6 to 0.9 have been conducted and the main results hold in all cases.  
6 
 
                                                          
representative sample of firms under 30 employees. It has rich data coverage and asks firms to compile 
information on ownership, employment, profitability, output, investment, capital stocks, assets, 
liabilities. Given that the data also cover non-listed firms and in particular micro-, small- and medium-
sized firms, this is of particular interest and provides a contribution to this literature.  
 
All sectors of the economy are surveyed which again facilitates a broad review. However, to 
appropriately compare profit oriented private firms to SOEs with alternative objective functions, we 
limited the sectors included in the analysis. As is standard practice, we excluded firms in financial 
intermediation and insurance, education and social work, social, sports and entertainment activities and 
not-for-profit activities. These assumptions are important as they provide us with a test of the effect of 
ownership on enterprise activities in sectors that are traditionally profit-oriented.  
 
For the sample used in our analysis, we apply a number of standard cleaning techniques. We remove 
outlier observations that are in the 1 percent tails of the distribution of each of the continuous variables. 
As we are applying a GMM model and require lags as instruments, we remove firms that do not have at 
least five consecutive observations. This restriction is required to facilitate using deeper lags as 
instruments if higher-order autocorrelation is evident. Our sample period runs from 2001 to 2012 which 
provides a long-panel element.  All value variables are deflated using annual GDP deflators produced by 
the General Statistics Office of Vietnam.   
 
Our estimation sample is described in table 1. In total, our sample includes 7,903 firms of which 5,709 
are private and 2,194 are SOEs. Our data cover 24,493 observations across these firms with 17,377 
observations for private and 7,116 observations for SOEs. The large number of observations available 
supports our identification strategy which estimates each sample individually, allowing investment to 
react to all variables differently for private and SOE firms.  
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Table 1: Overview of Firms and Observations in Sample 
 
Observations Firms 
 
Overall Private SOE Overall Private SOE 
       Total 24,493 17,377 7,116 7,903 5,709 2,194 
% of Total 100% 71% 29% 100% 72% 28% 
% of Each Group 
 
Overall Private SOE Overall Private SOE 
Large, Manufacturing 12% 9% 21% 12% 9% 19% 
SME, Manufacturing 31% 34% 23% 29% 31% 22% 
Large, Construction 5% 2% 14% 6% 3% 13% 
SME, Construction 13% 15% 10% 15% 16% 12% 
Large, Services 3% 1% 8% 3% 1% 8% 
SME, Services 36% 41% 26% 36% 40% 25% 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total 24,493 17,377 7,116 7,903 5,709 2,194 
Source: Authors calculations using VES 
       
Splitting the data by size categories and high-level sectors, it becomes evident that the majority of 
observations and firms are SMEs and in the manufacturing and market services sectors. Having a 
representative dataset which facilitates our analysis for both SMEs and large firms is an important 
contribution of our research.  Table 2 presents the mean values for the key variables used in our 
analysis. The average investment rate is 24% for all firms. It is higher for private firms than SOEs at 27% 
and 17% respectively. Table 3 presents a simple t-test of whether these mean differences are significant 
and we reject H0 of equivalence at the 1 percent level.  
 
The sales to capital ratio is high overall and is again higher for private firms that SOEs. Given the labour 
intensive nature of many activities in Vietnam it is unsurprising that high levels of output per unit of 
capital are evident. Private firms also appear to earn additional sales per unit capital relative to SOEs. 
This may be indicative of poor investments, which we test formally in the next section. The difference 
between the sales to capital ratios for state firms and for private firms is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level (Table 3). We also present the ratio of sales to total assets to reflect the fact that in some 
sectors, the contribution of tangible fixed assets to output is lessened.  
 
Turning to profitability, the ratio of profits to capital is 0.56 overall, 0.53 for private firms and 0.62 for 
SOEs. The profitability to total assets is also presented. It suggests a return on assets of approximately 5 
percent overall, with 5 percent for private and 6 percent for SOEs. Both of these variables appear to 
indicate higher profitability for SOEs that private firms. This is unsurprising in that many of the SOEs are 
active in protected and highly concentrated sectors. This ensures they can earn monopoly or oligopoly 
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rents. This suggests that it is important to control for market competition in our formal econometric 
testing. Again comparing the means in Table 3, the differences are statistically significant.  
Table 2: Overview of Firms and Observations in Sample 
 Variable Overall Private SOE 
 
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev 
I/K 0.24 0.92 0.27 0.97 0.17 0.77 
S/K 24.54 58.44 27.79 65.82 16.60 32.97 
S/TA 1.79 2.22 1.93 2.43 1.45 1.56 
Profits/K 0.56 1.71 0.53 1.78 0.62 1.50 
Profits/TA 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.10 
Q 30.98 73.57 35.06 82.84 21.03 41.59 
Leverage  0.50 0.31 0.49 0.31 0.53 0.31 
Receivables/TA 0.23 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.27 0.19 
Manufacturing 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.49 
Construction 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42 
Market Services 0.39 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.33 0.47 
Red River Delta 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 
South Region 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.24 0.43 
Other regions 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.29 0.45 
SME 0.80 0.40 0.89 0.31 0.58 0.49 
HHI 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 
State MP 0.37 0.17 0.35 0.17 0.40 0.19 
Source: Authors calculations using VES data. 
 
As a linear combination of the sales to capital and profits to capital, its mean follows a similar pattern. It 
is higher for private firms than for SOEs. Considering sales growth, ∆𝑙𝑛𝑆, in our sample firms post 
approximately 4 percent output growth annually in real terms. Private firms had slightly higher output 
growth 4.3 percent, with SOES at 3.7 percent.  Leverage, measured as total outstanding liabilities, stands 
at approximately 50 percent of total assets. SOEs have slightly higher levels of leverage than private 
firms. This may represent legacy issues or alternatively better access to credit from state-owned 
financial institutions. Receivables to total assets are 0.23 and are higher for SOEs than private firms.  
 
On the composition of the sample, 42 percent of the observations are in the manufacturing sector and 
the share of manufacturing firms is generally similar across SOE and private firms. Construction 
represents 18 percent of the sample and market services accounts for 39 percent of the data. In terms 
of the geographic distribution of the data, 40 percent of the observations are based in the Red River 
Delta region which contains the capital Ha Noi. Circa 33 percent of observations are in the South East 
region, which contains Ho Chi Minh City. Other regions represent an additional 24 percent of the data. 
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The sample is dominated by SMEs, which account fornearly 80 percent of observations. However the 
share of SMEs is much lower for SOEs that state-firms.  
 
HHI and the state market power variable capture time-varying sector controls. The sectoral breakdown 
is presented in table A1 in Annex A. The most concentrated industry, is as expected, mining and utilities.  
Focusing on the market presence of SOEs, the average share of SOEs in sectoral output is 17 percent.  
Table 3: T-Tests of Mean Differences for Selected Variables 
 
Private SOE Difference 
I/K 0.27 0.17 0.10 *** 
S/K 27.79 16.60 11.19 *** 
Profits/K  0.53 0.62 -0.09 *** 
S/TA 1.93 1.45 0.48*** 
Profits/TA 0.05 0.06 -0.02 *** 
Q 35.06 21.03 14.03 *** 
Leverage  0.49 0.53 -0.036 *** 
Receivables/TA 0.22 0.27 -0.05 *** 
SME 0.89 0.58 0.31 *** 
Source: Authors calculations using VES data. *** indicate significant at the 1 percent level, 
 
Table 4 presents the correlation coefficients for the main variables used in our assessment of the 
ownership effects of efficiency. The correlation coefficients are estimated firstly for the whole sample 
and then separately for private firms and SOEs. Focusing on the correlation coefficients between 
investment and the other control variables, the coefficients with the sales to capital, the profits to 
capital and the generated Q statistic are 0.18, 0.12 and 0.18 respectively. Limiting the sample to include 
only private firms, the correlation coefficients are similar with the profit to capital, investment 
correlation slightly higher. For SOEs, the coefficients are 0.17, 0.10 and 0.17 respectively. This would 
indicate that a slightly lower correlation between investment and indicators of the marginal benefit of 
capital is evident for SOEs relative to private firms. Formally testing these relationships in a causal 
manner is the main aim of our econometric section.  
 
The correlation coefficient between investment and sales growth is 0.04. Comparing private firms and 
SOEs, the picture is slightly different as the correlation coefficient is lower for private; 0.03 to 0.07. 
While this is in contrast to the measures of the marginal benefit of capital, simple correlation 
coefficients can be misleading as they do not control for any confounding factors or other covariates.  
 
Finally focusing on the correlation between investment and the financial measures (leverage and trade 
receivables), we find a higher correlation of investment to external finance for private firms relative to 
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SOEs. This may reflect the softer budget constraints and easier access to finance for SOEs who operate 
with an implicit or explicit government guarantee on liabilities and government financing of deficits or 
investment.  
Table 4: Correlation coefficients for Main Variables by Ownership 
All Firms 
 
I/K S/K P/K Q Leverage Receivables/TA 
I/K 1.00 
     S/K 0.18 1.00 
    P/K 0.12 0.34 1.00 
   Q 0.18 1.00 0.34 1.00 
  Leverage 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 1.00 
 Receivables/TA 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.22 1.00 
   
Private Firms 
   
 
I/K S/K P/K Q Leverage Receivables/TA 
I/K 1.00 
     S/K 0.18 1.00 
    P/K 0.13 0.34 1.00 
   Q 0.18 1.00 0.34 1.00 
  Leverage 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.02 1.00 
 Receivables/TA 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.17 1.00 
SOES 
 
I/K S/K P/K Q Leverage Receivables/TA 
I/K 1.00 
     S/K 0.17 1.00 
    P/K 0.10 0.40 1.00 
   Q 0.17 1.00 0.41 1.00 
  Leverage 0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.10 1.00 
 Receivables/TA 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.32 1.00 
Source: Authors calculations using VES data 
        
The final contribution of this paper to the literature is to test the effect on investment efficiency of 
changes in ownership of SOEs, through privatisations and equitizations. In our data, we are able to 
classify state-owned enterprises into five categories: 1) fully state-owned enterprises (both centrally and 
locally owned firms), 2) SOEs who have been equitized but the state retains a controlling shareholding (> 
50 percent of equity) 3) equitized firms in which the state retains a minority shareholding (< 50 percent 
of equity) 4) firms who have been equitized and then fully privatised and 5) firms who were fully 
privatized immediately. A key contribution of this paper is to test whether or not such changes in 
ownership alter the investment efficiency of the enterprise.  
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Table 5 and table 6 present the data on the number of observations in our sample for the SOEs and 
former SOEs who changed ownership overall and by firm size and sector.3 In total, nearly 50 percent of 
the SOEs in the data underwent some ownership change. The most frequent mode of ownership 
transfer was through direct privatisation. Just over 26 percent of the firms in our data indicate they 
transferred to full, direct privatization from state ownership. Nearly 10 percent of the firms were 
previously equitized but then became fully privatized.  A further 8.7 percent of firms were partially 
equitized but the state retained a majority shareholding and 7.4 percent were equitized with the state 
holding a minority stake.  
Table 5: Breakdown of Observations of State-owned Enterprises by Ownership Change 
 
Obs. Percent Firms Percent 
SOE 5,497 49.3% 1,772 48.0% 
Equitized  (SOE Share > 50%) 901 8.1% 320 8.7% 
Equitized (SOE Share <  50%) 735 6.6% 272 7.4% 
Privatised from Equitized 1,085 9.7% 361 9.8% 
Privatised from SOE 2,926 26.3% 967 26.2% 
All 11,144 100.0% 3,692 100.0% 
Source: Authors calculations using VES data. 
 
Table 6 presents the distribution of the observations by enterprise size and main sector of operation. 
The degree of privatization and equitization has been greater for SMEs than for large firms. This is 
unsurprising as many of the large firms owned by the Vietnamese state are in strategic sectors whereas 
many of the SMEs may be more likely a legacy issue from the command economy era. For large firms, 
the most frequently observed transition is to partial but controlling equitization whereas for SMEs, the 
majority of firms who transition, have been privatized completely.  
Table 6: Breakdown of Observations by Size and Sector 
 
Large SME Manufacturing Construction Services 
 
Obs Percent Obs Percent Obs Percent Obs Percent Obs Percent 
SOE 2,280 65.7% 3,217 41.9% 2,408 50.2% 1,213 49.6% 1,876 48.0% 
Equitized  (SOE Share > 50%) 403 11.6% 498 6.5% 361 7.5% 238 9.7% 302 7.7% 
Equitized (SOE Share <  50%) 305 8.8% 430 5.6% 307 6.4% 222 9.1% 206 5.3% 
Privatised from Equitized 237 6.8% 848 11.1% 567 11.8% 203 8.3% 315 8.1% 
Privatised from SOE 247 7.1% 2,679 34.9% 1,151 24.0% 569 23.3% 1,206 30.9% 
Total 3,472 100.0% 7,672 100.0% 4,794 100.0% 2,445 100.0% 3,905 100.0% 
Source: Authors calculations using VES data.  
 
3 Please note that the number of firms and observations from this data do not correspond to the tables above as in 
this data on the ownership change, a particular firm can shift category and therefore will be double counted. 
Identifying these firms who change is a key element in our identification strategy. In table 1, the firms and 
observations are discrete categories.  
12 
 
                                                          
Splitting the data by sector, we observe that the rate of retention of SOEs has been highest in 
manufacturing and the largest number of full privatisations from full SOE ownership have occurred in 
the market services sector. Partial equitization, with retention of majority or minority stakes, are highest 
in the construction sector.  
Table 7 presents the mean values for the main variables for the privatisation and equitization analysis. 
The data are split out for all firms and then divided by sector and size. Focusing firstly on all firms, we 
observe the investment rates are highest for privatized firms and lowest for firms with partial 
equitization. For equitized firms the profits to capital ratio is higher than full SOEs as well as for 
privatized firms. However, controlling for market structure and the ability to capture rents must be 
controlled for in a comparison of marginal products. The sales to capital ratio and Q are higher for 
privatized firms relative to all other groups.  
Table 7: Mean Values of Main Variables for Privatisation/Equitization Analysis 
 
All Manufacturing Construction Services 
  
Large SME Large SME Large SME 
SOE 
I/K 0.18 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 
S/K 17.28 10.8 11.43 21.82 16.12 13.96 27 
P/K 0.6 0.53 0.49 0.7 0.75 0.63 0.65 
Q 21.87 13.71 14.49 27.61 20.46 17.72 34.1 
Equitized  (SOE Share > 50%) 
I/K 0.12 0.12 0.1 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.15 
S/K 14.55 9.53 5.78 19.18 19.56 15.01 20.49 
P/K 0.71 0.51 0.26 0.64 0.59 1.11 1.2 
Q 18.48 12.12 7.34 24.27 24.73 19.17 26.08 
Equitized (SOE Share <  50%) 
I/K 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.2 0.14 
S/K 14.5 8.05 6.87 17.25 16.33 10.23 24.95 
P/K 0.67 0.46 0.46 0.73 0.7 0.84 0.93 
Q 18.4 10.25 8.77 21.87 20.71 13.09 31.6 
Privatised from Equitized 
I/K 0.25 0.17 0.23 0.49 0.19 0.3 0.34 
S/K 18.29 10.25 12.99 19.69 13.18 27.94 32.49 
P/K 0.58 0.54 0.44 0.85 0.56 0.41 0.77 
Q 23.14 13.03 16.44 24.98 16.72 35.21 41.03 
Privatised from SOE 
I/K 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.27 0.49 0.21 
S/K 35.05 11.23 17.07 12.35 12.13 17.63 64.73 
P/K 0.46 0.49 0.28 0.18 0.3 0.63 0.69 
Q 44.15 14.25 21.52 15.57 15.32 22.32 81.5 
Source: Authors calculations based on VES data.  
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Table 8 presents the correlation coefficients between investment and the Q statistic for each of the 
ownership groupings by sector and size. It is interesting to note that the highest correlation overall is for 
the group of firms that were privatized from equitization. With the direct privatization group displaying 
the joint lower correlation. However, this pattern does not hold when the correlation is estimated by 
sector and size.  
Table 8: Correlation Coefficients for Investment and Q statistic 
 
All Manufacturing Construction Services Large SME 
SOE 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.16 
Equitized  (SOE Share > 50%) 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 
Equitized (SOE Share <  50%) 0.19 0.36 0.29 0.12 0.24 0.17 
Privatised from Equitized 0.22 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.12 0.23 
Privatised from SOE 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.13 
Source: Authors calculations using VES data. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
This section presents the results of our main estimations. We firstly present our tests of the effects of 
ownership on marginal products, secondly present our estimates of the investment –sales growth 
elasticities by ownership, thirdly we test the relationship between investment and the Q statistic by 
ownership and finally we evaluate whether the effects of privatization and equitization alter the 
relationship between the Q statistic and investment.   
4.1 Investment, Fundamental Q and Ownership 
In this section, we present the estimates of our Q model to test the relationship between Q and 
investment by ownership. Our estimation strategy uses a GMM model with instruments to deal with 
measurement error in Q and potential omitted variable bias. Instruments are again taken from lags 
dated t-4 and t-5. Year controls are included in all regressions.  
 
Table 13 presents the coefficients estimates for the Q model for all firms (column (1)), for SOEs (column 
(2)), and for private firms (column (3)). Our estimates indicate a positive coefficient on the Q statistic for 
all firms that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In column (2), there is no significant 
relationship between Q and investment for the SOEs while the relationship for the private firms is 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level. These findings are clear and support our a-priori research 
hypotheses. Our estimated model does not identify a relationship between fundamentals and 
investment as indicated by the Q statistic for SOEs. This suggests that investment activities, investment 
strategies and plans are not driven solely by profitability concerns as measured by the marginal product 
of capital for SOEs. Our evidence does indicate that private firms evaluate investment in terms of its 
marginal benefit. Our findings is in line with the literature which suggests that SOEs objective functions 
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are not purely profit maximizing, focusing instead on social policy or political objectives.  These findings 
are also in line with our results from the sales-investment elasticities in the above section. 
In terms of control variables, the coefficient on leverage is negative and significant for private firms. This 
may indicate that debt overhang is acting as a drag on the investment of private firms in Vietnam. If 
outstanding credit balances are constraining current investment, this may restrict their future growth 
opportunities. The model also identifies investment as higher in the construction and services sectors 
relative to the manufacturing sector. This finding is driven by firms in the private sector. We do not find 
any effect of trade receivables on investment.  
Table 13: GMM Estimates of Fundamental Q Model 
 
All Firms SOEs Private Firms 
Dep Var: (I/K)it (1) (2) (3) 
Q 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Leverage t-1 -0.173 0.071 -0.330* 
 
(0.134) (0.137) (0.192) 
Receivables/TA t-1 0.358 -0.094 0.387 
 
(0.377) (0.525) (0.477) 
T -0.057*** -0.024** -0.075*** 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Construction 0.199* -0.088 0.400* 
 
(0.121) (0.141) (0.210) 
Services 0.251*** 0.150 0.351** 
 
(0.085) (0.122) (0.136) 
South East region -0.056 -0.059 -0.072 
 
(0.041) (0.066) (0.050) 
Other regions 0.010 -0.036 -0.007 
 
(0.031) (0.078) (0.038) 
SME -0.028 -0.046 -0.030 
 
(0.030) (0.034) (0.050) 
HHI -0.073 -0.591 1.930 
 
(1.271) (1.043) (2.951) 
State MP -0.238 -0.225 -0.261 
 
(0.185) (0.231) (0.263) 
N 24,769 8,177 16,592 
AR(1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) Test 0.053 0.473 0.030 
Sargan Test 0.124 0.997 0.217 
Instruments 140 140 140 
Notes: Model estimated using GMM with lagged values of all variables dated t-4 and t-5 as instruments. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year dummies also 
included in all regressions.  
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Our main finding from table 13 suggests that SOEs do not set investment plans based on the marginal 
product of capital whereas private firms are guided by such considerations. This finding is in line with 
the extant literature (Chen et al., 2011). To better explore the heterogeneity of the effects across firms 
in Vietnam, we present the results separately for firm size and sector in tables 14 and 15.  
 
Table 14 presents the breakdown between SMEs and Large firms. In columns (1) and (2) we present the 
results combining private and SOEs. Our estimates identify a positive effect of the Q statistic for both 
SMEs and large firms. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively. The coefficient for large firms is higher than that for small firms indicating a greater 
responsiveness of large firms to fundamentals in driving investment spending. This may be due to the 
fact that large firms have better access to internal and external capital and can react more quickly when 
opportunities arise. It  may also be the case that their scale provides large firms with a buffer to 
withstand investment uncertainties and allows them to commit to projects more quickly than their SME 
counterparts.  
 
Considering the relationship between Q and investment for SOEs, again, we do not identify a statistically 
significant relationship for either large firms or SMEs. In columns (5) and (6) our estimates indicate that 
there is a positive and significant effect of Q on investment for both SMEs and large private enterprises. 
To conclude, our findings again suggest that while both private SMEs and large firms have a positive and 
significant relationship between Q and investment, we find no evidence that SOEs plan investment 
spending on the basis of marginal product returns.  
 
Focusing on the control variables, our estimates indicate that private SMEs face a negative effect of debt 
overhang. In the period 2005 onwards, Vietnam experienced very rapid private sector credit growth 
(O’Toole and Newman, 2012). In fact, McInerney and O’Toole (2014) identify 2007 as a formal credit 
boom in Vietnam. While much of this credit expansion may be due to convergence effects, the increased 
indebtedness of private enterprise would now appear to be acting as a drag on corporate investment by 
SMEs. We also find a strong negative trend in investment for private SMEs with the investment rates 
falling considerably year on year. We find that the investment rates are higher for construction and 
service SMEs and for large service firms. 
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Table 14: GMM Estimates of Fundamental Q Model – By Firm Size 
 
All Firms SOEs Private firms 
 
SME Large SMEs Large SMEs Large 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Q 0.002** 0.007* -0.000 0.004 0.002** 0.014** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.007) 
Leverage t-1 -0.480*** -0.058 -0.309 -0.021 -0.560*** -0.176 
 
(0.168) (0.251) (0.217) (0.323) (0.208) (0.292) 
Receivables/TA t-1 0.565 0.555 0.383 0.483 0.590 -0.689* 
 
(0.475) (0.492) (0.787) (0.530) (0.538) (0.397) 
T -0.345*** 0.053 -0.183 -0.014 -0.390*** 0.084 
 
(0.112) (0.197) (0.160) (0.283) (0.141) (0.241) 
Construction 0.266* 0.119 -0.035 -0.160 0.336* 1.673 
 
(0.137) (0.250) (0.216) (0.232) (0.204) (1.082) 
Services 0.277*** 0.197 0.206 -0.068 0.301** 1.752* 
 
(0.092) (0.185) (0.165) (0.153) (0.130) (0.947) 
South East region -0.077 0.016 -0.112 -0.010 -0.074 -0.055 
 
(0.052) (0.051) (0.108) (0.067) (0.059) (0.093) 
Other regions 0.003 0.095 -0.026 -0.038 -0.016 0.208* 
 
(0.035) (0.070) (0.113) (0.080) (0.041) (0.121) 
HHI -0.209 1.212 -0.017 -0.552 -0.111 12.825 
 
(1.181) (2.068) (1.161) (1.653) (2.508) (8.620) 
State MS -0.105 -0.258 0.187 -0.352 -0.281 -0.370 
 
(0.244) (0.360) (0.358) (0.493) (0.307) (0.366) 
N 18,796 4,107 4,572 2,734 14,224 1,373 
AR(1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 
AR(2) Test 0.008 0.607 0.148 0.566 0.008 0.704 
Sargan Test 0.070 0.761 0.491 0.060 0.137 0.445 
Instruments 121.000 121.000 121.000 121.000 121.000 121.000 
Notes: Model estimated using GMM with lagged values of all variables dated t-4 and t-5 as instruments. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year dummies also 
included in all regressions. 
 
Table 15 estimates the relationship between investment and Q for firms in different industrial sectors: 
manufacturing and industry, construction and market services. The sectoral estimates are provided for 
all firms, SOEs and private firms.  
 
In the manufacturing sector, we identify a positive and significant effect of Q on investment for all firms 
and private firms. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. No effect is evident for 
SOEs. These findings are mirrored for firms in the construction and service sectors: we identify a positive 
and significant effect for all firms and for private firms but find no evidence of a significant relationship 
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for SOEs. The private firm coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level in the construction sector and 
the 10 percent level in the market services sector.  
 
On the magnitude of the coefficients for private firms, it appears that firms in the manufacturing sector 
display the highest sensitivity of investment to Q closely followed by the construction sector. The 
estimated coefficient for service firms is considerably lower. Given the profile of production in 
manufacturing and construction industries, physical investment may be more important in terms of the 
production structure. These firms may be more capital intensive therefore, react quicker to marginal 
products.  
 
To conclude, in this section, we found evidence in support of our research hypothesis 3 (H3) that the Q 
statistic is not a driver of investment for SOEs in Vietnam. Our results suggest that private firms appear 
to link investment expenditure to marginal products and are investing in line with traditional model 
expectations. SOEs do not display behaviour in line with traditional models which assume investment 
takes place until the marginal cost and marginal benefit of investment are equated. Our results would 
therefore suggest that investment efficiency is highest for private firms with no evidence of profit 
maximising investment spending by SOEs. It must be noted however that, given the SOEs may be set 
different policy objectives, decoupling investment spending from marginal products may be in line with 
broader political or social policy objectives. However, if such objectives are to increase efficiency in 
capital spending, then this evidence would suggest investment planning needs to be realigned.  
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Table 15: GMM Estimates of Fundamental Q Model – Sectoral Breakdown 
 
Manufacturing Construction Services 
 
All Firms SOEs Private All Firms SOEs Private All Firms SOEs Private 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Q 0.007*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.006*** 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage t-1 0.131 0.102 0.095 -0.372 0.349 -1.328 -0.368* -0.185 -0.497* 
 
(0.189) (0.215) (0.230) (0.436) (0.432) (1.034) (0.207) (0.277) (0.288) 
Receivables/TA t-1 -0.764 0.760 -0.438 0.185 -0.022 0.486 0.153 0.568 0.182 
 
(0.472) (0.638) (0.480) (0.536) (0.565) (0.741) (0.564) (0.651) (0.676) 
T -0.039*** -0.026 -0.057*** -0.049*** -0.010 -0.077*** -0.043 -0.045 -0.052 
 
(0.015) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.032) (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
South East region -0.025 -0.086 -0.019 -0.011 -0.079 0.005 -0.219** -0.019 -0.276** 
 
(0.041) (0.079) (0.049) (0.107) (0.148) (0.149) (0.093) (0.149) (0.109) 
Other regions -0.057 -0.158** -0.018 0.053 -0.072 0.005 -0.014 -0.073 -0.031 
 
(0.045) (0.074) (0.058) (0.087) (0.120) (0.114) (0.048) (0.105) (0.062) 
SME -0.009 -0.045 0.011 -0.028 -0.006 -0.073 -0.056 -0.012 -0.135 
 
(0.040) (0.054) (0.057) (0.061) (0.063) (0.130) (0.069) (0.072) (0.142) 
N 10,159 3,410 6,749 4,167 1,788 2,379 9,189 2,738 6,451 
AR(1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) Test 0.567 0.059 0.398 0.631 0.805 0.524 0.688 0.887 0.380 
Sargan Test 0.997 0.269 0.999 0.024 0.995 0.001 0.783 0.076 0.906 
Instruments 95 95 95 88 88 88 95 95 95 
Notes: Notes: Model estimated using GMM with lagged values of all variables dated t-4 and t-5 as instruments. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year dummies also included in all regressions. Time varying sector controls include HHI and 
State MP. 
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4.2 Exploring the Effects of Equitization and Privatisation 
The final contribution of this paper is to build on the extant literature on firm performance following 
privatisation. Table 16 presents the results of the Q model estimated on the sample of current and 
former state-owned enterprises. Our main research question in this section is whether or not the 
relationship between the Q statistic and investment changes when SOEs in Vietnam have been 
privatised or equitized. If that privatization, or equitization improves the performance of the firm, or at 
realigned its objective function towards profit maximisation, we would expect that Q would be positive 
or higher for groups of firms who have undergone such an ownership change.  
 
In table 16, we test the effect of Q on investment, and interact Q with indicator variables for the 4 
groups of ownership change identifiable in our data. These are 1) Equitized  (SOE Share > 50%), 2) 
Equitized  (SOE Share < 50%), 3) Privatised from Equitized and 4) Privatised from SOE . We use 
interaction effects to avoid issues that occur due to the small samples of firms in some of these 
categories. We also present the results by industrial sector and firm size to explore the heterogeneity of 
ownership changes on investment efficiency across the Vietnamese economy. The models are estimated 
using GMM again with instruments dated t-4 and t-5. The Sargan test supports instrument validity at 
standard significance levels. Controls for leverage, receivables, HHI and state market power are included 
in all regressions. Year, sector and region dummies are also included.  
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Table 16: Test of Investment-Q Relationship for Equitized and Privatized Firms with SOEs 
 
All Firms Sectors Size 
  
Manufacturing Construction Services Large SME 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Q -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004* -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Equitized  (SOE Share > 50%) 0.030 -0.329 0.080 -0.433 -0.296 -0.012 
 
(0.176) (0.327) (0.174) (0.346) (0.261) (0.128) 
Equitized (SOE Share <  50%) -0.042 -0.260 -0.142 -0.087 -0.418 -0.112 
 
(0.189) (0.245) (0.183) (0.266) (0.305) (0.146) 
Privatised from Equitized -0.125 -0.268 0.115 -0.380 -0.744** 0.127 
 
(0.206) (0.345) (0.226) (0.274) (0.299) (0.199) 
Privatised from SOE -0.312 -0.213 -0.145 -0.465 -0.335 -0.005 
 
(0.273) (0.311) (0.324) (0.323) (0.243) (0.258) 
Equitized  (Share > 50%) x Q 0.005 0.026 -0.001 0.011 0.011 0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.020) (0.002) (0.014) (0.009) (0.003) 
Equitized  (Share < 50%)  x Q 0.010*** 0.017 0.009** 0.000 0.018* 0.011*** 
 
(0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) 
Privatised from Equitized  x Q -0.001 0.012 -0.002 0.001 0.039*** -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.019) (0.005) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) 
Privatised from SOE  x Q 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.018* 0.004** 0.018 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) 
N 11,320 4,767 2,332 3,847 3,664 7,656 
ar1p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ar2p 0.074 0.108 0.221 0.467 0.306 0.068 
Sargan Test 0.995 0.438 0.9999 0.986 0.020 0.983 
Instruments 212 226 184 211 222 226 
Notes: Additional year controls included in all regressions.  Estimates are produced using GMM estimation 
techniques with lagged levels as instruments. Lags are dated t-4, t-5 for all variables. Orthogonal deviations are 
used to remove firm-specific heterogeneity. Sectoral dummies, and regional dummies also included as are firm size 
classes. Controls for leverage, receivables, HHI and State MP also included in the regressions. 
 
In addition to testing the improvement in investment efficiency following privatisation and equitization 
against existing SOEs, it is also of interest to benchmark how these firms stack up against private firms. 
In table 17, we estimate the average Q for private firms, equitized firms with a less than 50 percent state 
holding and immediately privatised firms. We can see that the value of Q is higher for both privatised 
groupings with fully privatised higher than equitized firms. This result holds across all firms and for 
SMEs. The average effects are not significant for large firm. These former SOEs may find restructuring 
and legacy size issues difficult to deal with. Across sectors, in both manufacturing and services privatised 
firms have a higher average Q than private firms. These findings indicate that privatisation, in improving 
the efficiency of capital allocation, is a successful policy initiative in the Vietnamese case.  
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Table 17: Test of Investment-Q Relationship for Equitized and Privatized Firms with Privatized Firms 
 
All Firms Sectors Size 
  
Manufacturing Construction Services Large SME 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Private 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.001** 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Equitized  (Share < 50%)   0.005* 0.011 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.005* 
 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) 
Privatised from SOE 0.014* 0.009** 0.001 0.013* -0.014 0.014* 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.007) 
       N 15,566 6,364 2,233 5,983 1,875 13,691 
ar1p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ar2p 0.062 0.784 0.980 0.542 0.219 0.033 
Sargan Test 0.904 1.000 0.000 0.980 1.000 0.886 
Instruments 263 256 191 224 241 258 
Notes: Additional year controls included in all regressions.  Estimates are produced using GMM estimation 
techniques with lagged levels as instruments. Lags are dated t-4, t-5 for all variables. Orthogonal deviations are 
used to remove firm-specific heterogeneity. Sectoral dummies, and regional dummies also included as are firm size 
classes. Controls for leverage, receivables, HHI and State MP also included in the regressions. Also included is the 
average Q effect for privatised from equitized but it is insignificant.  
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper evaluates the efficiency of capital allocation amongst Vietnamese firms. It contributes to the 
literature on corporate governance and capital allocation and the literature on the effects of ownership 
change and efficiency in transition economies. It also provides important insights into the policy reform 
agenda for Vietnam.  
Using a structural Q model of finance, we find no significant relationship between Q and investment for 
SOEs and a positive and significant effect for private firms. This also holds for both private firms and 
SMEs and across manufacturing, construction and market services sectors.  
Using the structural Q model, we also test the effect of privatisation and equitization policies on the 
investment efficiency of former SOEs. We find that fully privatised former SOEs which are equitized SOEs 
that retain only a minority state shareholding have a positive relationship between Q and investment 
suggesting efficiency in capital allocation. We also find that the investment of these categories of firms 
has a stronger link to our Q measure relative to private firms, again reinforcing the positive benefits of 
reform.  
Our findings have a number of important policy implications for Vietnam in transition. We find no link 
between investment and firm fundamentals for Vietnamese SOEs. This would suggest that a continued 
implementation of reform-oriented policies should improve capital allocation in the economy. 
Additionally, the results suggest that the reform agenda to date has had a positive effect on the 
performance of privatised or equitized firms. A continued focus on reforming the SOE sector and 
undertaking managed and balanced privatisation and equitizisation policies can contribute to improved 
investment efficiency. Such reforms can lay the platform for continued Vietnamese growth in the 
medium term.    
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A1: Data Appendix 
Additional summary statistics and description of the data cleaning process.  
Table A1: Sector Means of Time Varying Sector Controls 
Sector HHI (Mean) SOE Market Share 
1. Manufacturing of food, beverages and tobacco  0.7% 37.2% 
2. Manufacturing of leather, textiles, garments  1.0% 27.0% 
3. Manufacturing of chemicals and chemicals  2.7% 38.1% 
4. Manufacturing of wood, paper, and furniture  0.6% 25.0% 
 5. Manufacturing of rubber and plastics  0.9% 23.0% 
 6. Manufacturing of other non-metalic metals 1.6% 47.5% 
7. Manufacturing of basic or fabricated metals  1.4% 23.2% 
8. Manufacturing of machinery, equipment and other n.e.c. 3.4% 22.0% 
9. Other Manufacturing  3.0% 26.6% 
10. Construction and Real Estate  0.5% 53.2% 
11. Wholesale trade  1.1% 47.1% 
 12. Retail trade  1.0% 35.7% 
13. Wholesale and retail motor trade  1.4% 37.3% 
14. Transport, storage and communication  6.1% 66.4% 
15. Other market Services  0.8% 35.4% 
16. Mining and utilities  17.9% 75.6% 
Sectoral breakdown used in analysis: Manufacturing (1-9, 16), Construction (10), Services (11-15)  
Source: VES Sample data 
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Table A2: Comparison of Means of Main Variables by Firm Type 
 
All Large Firms SMEs 
  
Manufacturin
g 
Constructio
n 
Service
s 
Manufacturin
g 
Constructio
n 
Service
s 
 
Private Firms 
I/K 0.27 0.21 0.26 0.43 0.23 0.27 0.31 
S/K 27.79 10.88 23.62 20.24 15.22 13.94 47.05 
Q 35.06 13.76 29.81 25.70 19.20 17.60 59.33 
P/K 0.53 0.36 0.50 0.97 0.30 0.33 0.83 
 
State Firms 
I/K 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.18 
S/K 16.60 10.43 20.68 13.87 10.12 16.56 25.93 
Q 21.03 13.24 26.17 17.62 12.85 21.01 32.78 
P/K 0.62 0.52 0.70 0.71 0.46 0.73 0.73 
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